I. INTRODUCTION
It has been estimated that Amazon had, in recent history, 90% of the e-book market cornered (though more recent estimates put Amazon's e-book market share at approximately 60%).
1 In other words, Amazon is making a killing. However, killings do not happen without victims. 2 For * B.A., Colgate University; M.A., San Francisco State University; J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Pittsburgh. The author would like to thank Professor Peter Oh for his comments, suggestions, and other editorial assistance. Any errors or omissions are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.
1 Andrew Albanese, Judge Approves Final E-book Settlements, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Dec. 6, 2013, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/content-and-e-books/article/ 60282-judge-approves-final-e-book-settlements-payments-to-begin-in-early-2014.html. 2 For a particularly acerbic-and not unbiased-take on Amazon's business practices, see Kathleen Sharp, Amazon's Bogus Anti-Apple Crusade, SALON (Jan. 12, 2014), available at http://www .salon.com/2014/01/12/amazons_bogus_anti_apple_crusade/ ("You may remember that Amazon helped persuade the U.S.
[DOJ] to sue Apple . . . claiming that Apple conspired with . . . publishers to fix the price of e-books . . . . Amazon, the web's biggest retailer, had been selling published books at a moneylosing rate of $9.99. Why? To get us to buy its Kindle e-book reader, and to dominate the e-book market. . . . This meant that publishers-who had invested in the writing, production, promotion and distribution of these books-couldn't sell their wares at the recommended retail price of $14.99. Nor could brick-and-mortar stores match Amazon's money-losing discounts.").
court found that all of the parties conspired to "raise, fix, and stabilize the retail price" of e-books in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 10 Yet, while litigation was ongoing, Random House, the largest publisher in America, and Penguin agreed to merge (announced on October 29, 2012), 11 received approval from the DOJ (February 14, 2013), 12 and completed the merger (July 1, 2013). 13 Though Random House was not a party to the DOJ's antitrust suit, it had, in only a matter of months after the illegal agreements were forged, signed essentially the same contract with Apple that the other publishers had signed.
14 While Penguin's settlement agreement, the terms of which will be discussed below, will be binding upon the newly created company ("Penguin Random House"), 15 the DOJ's approval of the merger-with no conditions other than those imposed by Penguin's settlement agreementoccurred while the DOJ continued litigation against Apple. This seems to indicate some cognitive dissonance on the DOJ's part. While the publishers settled without admitting guilt, the DOJ, in arguing for its case against Apple, necessarily had to show that Apple colluded with the publishers to raise prices. In other words, at the same time the DOJ was considering and ultimately approving the Penguin-Random House merger, it was also arguing in court that Apple and Penguin (and other publishers) had conspired to engage in anti-competitive behavior. There seems to be something counterintuitive about the DOJ allowing a company to complete a merger while at the same time arguing that that company had recently engaged in anti-competitive behavior.
Why might the DOJ have approved the merger while continuing to litigate? The DOJ must have believed that the merger would not result in anti-competitive effects. As will be discussed below, publishing is an industry which is undergoing radical change. This is due, in part, to advances in technology and to Amazon's trailblazing practices. Furthermore, publishers have already shown that they are more inclined to try strong-arm tactics to maintain the status-quo rather than innovatewhich explains the DOJ's antitrust suit against Apple and the New York publishers. So, the questions we need to answer are: why exactly did the DOJ so quickly approve of the merger during this related litigation, and will the approval of the Penguin-Random House merger undermine the ability of Penguin's prior settlement to promote or protect consumer welfare?
Part II of this paper will elucidate the Southern District of New York's opinion in which Judge Cote found Apple guilty of anti-competitive behavior; the decision chronicles nicely the anxiety traditional New York book publishers have been feeling for years because of Amazon's ultracompetitive low-pricing and ground-breaking new programs (as exemplified by the new MatchBook program described above). 16 This elucidation of the New York publishers' anxiety and desperation, which manifested in the publishers' anti-competitive behavior, heightens the counterintuitive nature of the DOJ's approval of the Penguin-Random House merger. Part III will lay out some of the DOJ's criteria for evaluating mergers, as outlined in its latest Horizontal Merger Guidelines-there, I will also briefly discuss the antitrust policies of the Obama administration as explained by members of the administration. In Part IV, I will provide an analysis of the merger, using the Guidelines, which will go a long way toward explaining why the DOJ had few concerns about the competitive effects of the merger. This will resolve the apparent mystery of why the DOJ approved the merger with the Apple litigation ongoing. I will also briefly explain why, not just from the DOJ analysis, but from lay and industry perspectives as well, the Penguin-Random House merger seemed like it would benefit consumers-and why it may actually have the opposite effect. This uncertainty in possible outcomes suggests that the DOJ erred in providing the public no insight into its decision-making process. Greater transparency would have laid to rest not only the question of what effects this merger is expected to have on the industry; it also would have assured the public that the DOJ actually had thoroughly considered the nuances in a rapidly changing industry in evaluating likelihood of any unintended consequences. Hachette Book Group, Inc., HarperCollins Publishers LLC, Holtzbrinck Publishers LLC ("Macmillan"), Penguin Group (USA), Inc., Simon & Schuster, Inc., and Random House are known as publishing's "Big Six." 17 The Big Six wanted to raise e-book prices for its New York Times Bestsellers above Amazon's standard $9.99. 18 Fortuitously for the publishers, Apple was planning on launching its first iPad, and it was hoping to have its iBookstore established in time for the launch. 19 Five of the Big Six (i.e., all of the publishers except for Random House)-referred to below as the "Big Five" and "Publisher Defendants" alternatively-met with Apple and realized they shared a goal: "[T]hat there be no price competition at the retail level. Apple did not want to compete with Amazon . . . on price; and the Publisher Defendants wanted to end Amazon's $9.99 pricing and increase significantly the prevailing price point for e-books."
II. GETTING
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There are two models by which the publishers can set prices for books: the wholesale model and the agency model. The wholesale model functions in that the publisher receives a designated "wholesale" price for each unit and the retailer, in this case Amazon, sets the retail price. 21 The agency model is where "the publisher sets the retail price and the retailer sells the e-book as [the publisher's] agent." 22 Because the publishers had been operating under the wholesale model, Amazon was able to sell the books for whatever price it wanted, thus the $9.99 price point for many books. The publishers had tried various methods to combat Amazon which proved fruitless (e.g., "windowing" whereby the publishers would release hardcovers before e-books in order to stimulate sales of the hardcovers). 29 However, it became clear to the Publisher Defendants that they needed to take Apple's offer.
Amazon was aware that the publishers were going to push for a change to an agency model; in response, Amazon created the Kindle Digital Platform in January 2010, which allowed Amazon to deal directly with authors-by allowing any and all authors to publish any new titles, or old This is the state of things. Amazon is back in business with a diminished, but healthy, market share of 60% of e-book sales. 33 The Big Six is now five, and because of their settlements with the DOJ, each of them has had to relinquish its profitable (if coerced) agency agreement with Amazon, putting them essentially back where they started-except that they are no longer free to play hardball with Amazon for years because of the settlement agreements. As the excerpt from the settlement agreement above shows, the Publisher Defendants have no say for two years over Amazon's pricing of e-books (as opposed to what had previously been the case: publishers had at least the possibility of playing hardball with Amazon, but had been afraid to do so because Amazon could retaliate). Essentially, the publishers are worse off now than they were before they had tried to strongarm Amazon. Specifically, Penguin Random House is worse off in the sense that it has a more limited say over pricing. However, it is better off in the sense that it will have the combined market share and resources of two of the former Big Six. Elucidation of the DOJ's prompt approval of this merger raises two questions: (1) suggestively titled law review article above concluded, "While the antitrust agencies under Obama plainly are intent on enforcing the antitrust laws more aggressively than the prior Administration, the increase has, to date, been modest." 38 In other words, the authors were criticizing the Obama Administration for not providing "major change" from the Bush Administration; but they would reject the proposition that the DOJ is soft on antitrust enforcement. 39 Working under the assumption that the DOJ and FTC are intent on preventing anti-competitive mergers, how are they determining when action is or is not appropriate?
In 2010, the DOJ and FTC released new horizontal merger guidelines that "outline how the federal antitrust agencies evaluate the likely competitive impact of mergers and whether those mergers comply with U.S. antitrust law." 40 (A horizontal merger is a merger between actual or potential competitors. 41 Seeing as how the Big Six, though united in their opposition to Amazon, are still competitors whose products compete for consumers' dollars, the merger between Penguin and Random House is a horizontal merger.) The "primary goal" of the new guidelines is to help "identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that either are competitively beneficial or likely will have no competitive impact on the marketplace." 42 We can do a bit of quasi a priori reasoning from just these revelations, plus what facts we already know. Let us begin with the facts: the DOJ approved the Penguin-Random House merger without conditions-and we also know that the Penguin settlement applies to Penguin Random House. If the basic policy considerations behind the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines include not just challenging harmful mergers, but also getting out of the way of mergers that seem beneficial, then the speed with which the DOJ got 38 out of the way, 43 in addition to the fact that they did not impose conditions on the merger, suggest that the DOJ believed this merger would be beneficial, or at worst, have a negligible effect on the market.
To better understand how the DOJ came to such a conclusion, we can start with basic, and broad, assumptions underlying the DOJ's approach to mergers. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Christine A. Varney of the DOJ's Antitrust Division speaking empirically based on ten-year department statistics, "The vast majority of mergers are procompetitive and enhance consumer welfare or are competitively benign." 44 Mergers of course can detrimentally affect consumers, which Ms. Varney stated "can take many forms, including higher prices, slower innovation, lower quality, and reduced product variety. In some cases, a transaction's effects may take the form of reduced incentives to innovate, to cut prices, or to expand consumer choice through product variety." 45 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines begin with a citation to Section 7 of the Clayton Act 46 : the Act "prohibits mergers if 'in any line of commerce . . . the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.'" 47 Negative impacts on the consumers may occur as a result of "unilateral" or "coordinated" effects (where the former is due to the detrimental conduct of one firm in particular and the latter is due to coordinated behavior among rivals). 48 Mergers, the Guidelines indicate, should not be allowed to entrench or enhance market power, meaning that the merger should not "encourage one or more firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives." 49 In other words, the Guidelines state that the agencies should be on the lookout for mergers that are likely to negatively impact consumers in some way, including, but not limited to, raised prices-"Enhanced market power can 43 Four months from announcement of the merger to approval of the merger, as we will recall, was during a relevant antitrust suit. See supra Part I. 44 While a complete survey of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is beyond the scope of this note, it will be useful to outline some of the considerations which seem particularly relevant to this merger: (1) market shares and market concentration; (2) unilateral effects; (3) coordinated effects; and (4) efficiencies.
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Before delving into the first criterion, market shares and market concentration, it is important to note a few things about "market definition," which is what "helps specify the line of commerce and section of the country in which the competitive concern arises."
52 Interestingly enough, the Guidelines state that the "Agencies analysis need not start with market 50 Id. 51 For the sake of concision and relevance, not all of the factors the Agencies might consider can be considered thoroughly in this note. However, I will briefly synopsize the other criteria the Agencies may look to, which include: Powerful buyers, entry, failure and exiting assets, mergers of competing buyers, and partial acquisitions.
The Agencies define powerful buyers as those buyers who are "able to negotiate favorable terms with their suppliers . . . . The Agencies consider the possibility that powerful buyers may constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise prices." Id. at 27. This factor will be deeply entangled with the issue of Amazon's involvement in the publishing industry. See infra, Part IV for further discussion of the possible, but uncertain, effects this merger can have on Amazon.
Entry concerns whether potential competitors have the ability to enter the market and "deter or counteract any competitive effects of concern so the merger will not substantially harm customers." HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 28. The Agencies will attempt to determine whether competitors are likely to enter the market in time to have a sufficient counteracting effect on anti-competitive concerns. Barriers to entry for online independent publishers are low, on account of programs like Amazon's KDP. There may be some debate about whether the entry barriers are low for physical book publishers; however, the proliferation of print-on-demand services for independent authors and publishers probably goes a long way toward allaying this concern.
Failure and exiting assets pertains to mergers involving firms which are literally unable to meet their financial obligations and are incapable of reorganizing by filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and have been unable to "elicit reasonable alternative offers that . . . pose a less severe danger to competition than . . . the proposed merger." Id. at 32. This factor is irrelevant in this case.
Mergers of competing buyers is essentially the same "framework [under discussion, except it is aimed toward evaluating] whether a merger is likely to enhance market power on the buying side of the market." Id. There appear to be neither controversy nor concern relevant to this factor.
Partial acquisitions involve one firm's "partial acquisition of a competitor." Id. at 33. This factor is irrelevant in this case.
52 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 7.
definition" and that analysis may indeed "suggest[] alternative and reasonably plausible candidate markets." 53 This implies that "market" is somewhat of a fluid concept. However, a basic definition will be helpful in laying the conceptual foundation for what is to follow. "Market" may be defined in various ways; for the sake of simplicity, however, a broad definition will suffice: "market" is the concept which encompasses the production, demand, and revenue resulting from the sales of specific types of goods, the interchangeability of such goods determining the extent of a firm's power over the pricing of these goods. 54 "Market" is a matter of definition, which means that the relevant market can be determined in various ways-the DOJ recognizes this: "The Agencies implement . . . principles of market definition flexibly when evaluating different possible candidate markets . . . [some market definitions] are not always intuitive and may not align with how industry members use the term 'market.'"
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Market share is defined as "The percentage of the market for a product that a firm supplies, usually calculated by dividing the firm's output by the total market output. In antitrust law, market share is used to measure a firm's market power." 56 The Horizontal Guidelines state that the agencies "normally calculate market shares for all firms that currently produce products in the relevant market, subject to the availability of data . . . [and] also . . . for other market participants if this can be done to reliably reflect their competitive significance." 57 The agencies recognize that looking at past market shares may be somewhat of an inaccurate predictor of future competitiveness (e.g., in situations in which firms are anticipated to have exclusive access to new technology, which would presumably increase those firms' competitiveness above what past market share would indicate). 58 Market share, as measured by revenue, is an important metric 53 Id. 54 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (9th ed. 2009) definition for "market": "A place of commercial activity in which goods or services are bought and sold. . . A geographic area or demographic segment considered as a place of demand for particular goods or services." And in an antitrust context, Black's Law Dictionary states further that a "product market" is, "[t]he part of a relevant market that applies to a firm's particular product by identifying all reasonable substitutes for the product and by determining whether these substitutes limit the firm's ability to affect prices." 55 because it reflects "the real-world ability of firms to surmount all of the obstacles necessary to offer products on terms and conditions that are attractive to customers."
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Market concentration is one way the Agencies can measure the anticompetitive effects of a merger. Market concentration may be measured by calculating the "Herfindahl-Hirschman Index" ("HHI"). 60 HHI is calculated by taking the market shares of each of the firms within the market and summing the square of each market share: "The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the case of pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market)." 61 The Agencies look not only to the post-merger HHI, but the change in HHI from pre-to post-merger. The Agencies employ the following categories of markets: Unconcentrated Markets: HHI below 1500; Moderately Concentrated Markets: HHI between 1500 and 2500; and Highly Concentrated Markets: HHI above 2500. 62 As the DOJ states: "The higher the post-merger HHI and the increase in the HHI, the greater are the Agencies' potential competitive concerns. . . ."
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Unilateral effects are effects wrought upon the market directly by the newly merged firm. A merged firm may be capable of various flavors of anticompetitive behavior: a merged firm may be able to "diminish competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price of . . . products above the pre-merger level." 64 Another important unilateral effect concerns the merger's impact on innovation; this also can take a couple of forms including "reduced incentive to continue with an existing product-development or reduced incentive to initiate development of new products."
IV. WHY THE PENGUIN-RANDOM HOUSE MERGER SEEMS LIKE A GOOD IDEA-AND WHY IT MAY BE A BAD ONE
Recall the Horizontal Guidelines criteria discussed above: (1) market shares and market concentration; (2) unilateral effects; (3) coordinated effects; and (4) efficiencies. The chairman and chief executive of one of the Random House's parent companies, Bertelsmann, said the merger "will enable investments worldwide in new digital publishing models, in new distribution paths, products and services and in the major growth markets."
74 Though we can hardly expect objectivity from a Random House executive, it is not implausible to assume that Penguin Random House will have a greater ability to increase efficiency-this does not seem controversial. So, let us assume arguendo that the companies are correct that as a larger entity they will be able to invest in research and development, combine assets, and make their operations overall leaner and more efficient. Let us also assume arguendo that we have no need to worry about coordinated effects (in particular price fixing), courtesy of the DOJ's settlement with the New York publishers which prevents the publishers from having any say whatsoever, for two years, over retail pricing of e-books. That leaves us market shares, market concentration, and unilateral effects to concern ourselves with.
Regarding market shares and market concentration, note that it is possible-likely even-that the DOJ did not concretely define the market, meaning that it probably did not conclusively determine whether paperback books, audio books, e-books, hardcover books, etc. all belonged to the same market. 75 Also bear in mind that in 2012, Penguin's U.S. overall market 74 Press Release, Penguin Group USA LLC, Penguin and Random House to Combine Creating the World's Leading Trade Publisher; Penguin Random House, available at http://www.penguin.com/ static/pages/aboutus/pressrelease/penguin_random_house_102912.php. 75 Note that Penguin and Random House, in presenting their views to the European authorities, urged the EU to consider various types of media to constitute a single market; and the EU actually decided not to definitively answer the question, but rather it proceeded under findings that, in regard to the various types of media, there would be no anticompetitive effects. Bertelsmann v. Penguin Random House, No. COMP/M.6789, EUR-Lex 32013M6789, at *25, *30 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 5, 2013).
If in standard publishing contracts, e-book rights are bundled with physical book rights, then the publishers' market share in the two media should be coextensive. However, it is not at all clear that this is going to be a reliable presumption going forward. For example, authors may insist, going forward, on unbundling rights to e-books from rights to physical books in contractual negotiations; in which case, a share was 10.45% and Random House's was 17.28%. 76 Using these numbers, the pre-merger HHI was 615.86. 77 The post-merger HHI would be 977.01. 78 Recall that, under the DOJ's classification, an HHI of under 1500 signals an unconcentrated market; and the lower the HHI, the lower the Agencies' competitive concerns. Because the HHI is well under 1500, the Agencies likely concluded that this merger was far from being a competitive concern, despite whatever misgivings it otherwise would have on account of the concurrent antitrust suit against Apple.
publisher's market share of physical and electronic books may vary substantially. More, there is the issue of substitutiality: are e-books substitutions for physical books or supplements? Programs such as Amazon's MatchBook endeavor to entice customers to buy both physical and electronic books. See also infra note 96 on the non-substitutiality of electronic and physical books. This suggests that physical and electronic books ought to be considered to be separate markets. This would have the added benefit of increasing scrutiny on the e-book market, rather than having it swept under the rug by collapsing it into a broader "books" market. This situation is complex, and there is no indication that the DOJ has given the appropriate attention to these nuances. Note that even if e-books are considered to constitute a separate market, that market may currently be so small that its import is accordingly marginal. However, the market may continue to grow, making inattentiveness to this market shortsighted.
And even if publishers' rights to the two media are coextensive, all of the difficulties discussed in this note, pertaining specifically to e-books, suggest that the DOJ needs to give serious consideration to how it defines market going forward. Is this turbulence in the publishing industry, pertaining to e-books, more than a blip on the competitive effects analysis if e-books are considered separately from the physical book market?
76 Tom Tivnan, Scholastic Cracks US Six, THE BOOKSELLER, May 25, 2012. Numbers are based on 19 weeks up to May 13, 2012. Mr. Tivnan sourced his statistics from Nielsen Bookscan. Market share for the top ten publishing groups in the United States are as follows:
Figure 1
Recall that unilateral effects are those effects on a market caused by a merged firm. A merged firm may have effects on a market, which are actually pro-competitive. We can imagine what such a gloss might look like in this case. In order for the New York publishers to deal with Amazon effectively, the publishers need to combine their resources. Recent history supports the idea that these publishers, with the leverage they currently have, are ill-equipped to handle Amazon. The publishing industry is sailing into uncharted waters largely because of e-books. The root cause of the Apple antitrust suit discussed above was the Big Six's worries that Amazon's way of doing business under the old wholesale model was putting pressure on the bottom lines of these companies-but none of the companies, alone, were powerful enough to force Amazon to agree to a different pricing model, which would be more favorable to the publishers. Thus, they colluded with Apple in order to raise prices. The implication here seems to be, then, that if these publishing houses are to thrive in this new era of publishing which-though not yet dominated by e-books-is significantly intertwined with the issue of revenue gained from e-books, then the publishers are going to need some way of gaining some bargaining power in order to deal effectively with Amazon; the "idea was that the So, the conventional take on why the DOJ allowed the merger to go forward so easily is that the numbers suggested there were no competitive concerns, and the DOJ likely reasoned that the traditional publishing companies were in need of more leverage in order for the publishing industry to bargain more effectively with Amazon, thus giving the publishing industry a way to try to preserve itself. This conventional explanation is not as easy to swallow on second glance. As noted above, Penguin's settlement agreement is applicable to Penguin Random House.
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And part of what is required of Penguin is that it eliminates any agreements it made with e-book retailers which limited the retailers' ability to set the prices. 82 This restriction is binding for two years. 83 According to an industry insider, "The Justice Department came in at a time when agency pricing was weakening Amazon's hold and dispersing the e-book market . . . . By eliminating fixed prices for e-books, they have handed the advantage back to Amazon. Now everyone else is losing share." 84 One independent publisher had this to say about the merger: "Like a lot of people, I at first thought the merger was a good thing in the fight against Amazon. Finally, a company with enough clout to stand up to Amazon's thuggishness . . Apple guilty of violating antitrust law, Judge Cote said that the agreements between the publishers, in which they colluded to raise prices, compelled the Publisher Defendants to move Amazon and other retailers to an agency model for the distribution of e-books, removed the ability of retailers to set the prices of their e-books and compete with each other on price . . . and allowed the Publisher Defendants to raise the prices for their e-books, which they promptly did on both New Releases and Bestsellers, as well as backlist titles.
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For this, along with other reasons (such as the resultant decrease in the quantity of e-book titles sold by Publisher Defendants 91 ), Judge Cote found ample reason to conclude that the defendants violated applicable antitrust laws.
92 Judge Cote's conclusion is fascinating because it illustrates that what from one perspective seems to be pro-competition can, from another perspective, be anti-competitive. To wit: Publisher Defendants no doubt considered their collusion to be pro-competitive in the sense that it would give them an upper hand in dealing with Amazon; but that same action raised prices and prevented retailers from setting the prices of their goods which stifled competition among retailers, and therefore was detrimental to consumers who would have to pay higher prices for goods. The publishing business is in a period of transition now which has upended the status quo; Amazon has changed the game and, from the perspective of the Big Five, is devaluing e-books, and consequently cutting into publishers' profits, possibly threatening the long-term viability of an entire industry. In Apple, Judge Cote chastised Apple by noting that even if Amazon had been engaging in commercially detrimental and monopolistic pricing, "Apple's combination with the Publisher Defendants to deprive a monopolist of some of its market power is [not] pro-competitive and healthy for our economy, it is wrong."
94 Judge Cote's point is poignantly summarized by the following: "Another company's alleged violation of antitrust laws is not an excuse for engaging in your own violations of law." 95 There are many ambiguous variables in the Penguin Random House merger; as a foundational matter, it is necessary to ask-who is really going to benefit from this merger? At first blush it appears that Penguin Random House wins because it will have increased bargaining power, owing to the sheer amount of titles it publishes-Amazon will have to deal if it wants to provide these titles to its customers. Otherwise, the customers will go elsewhere for these titles and Amazon loses. This scenario seems straightforward, and likely, enough. However, owing to the Penguin settlement, which is binding on Penguin Random House, it is not clear at all that Amazon is the loser in this arrangement. After all, the agency pricing model that the Publisher Defendants so desperately sought is now an unavailable option for the next two years-time during which Amazon will be able to further accustom consumers to paying $9.99 for popular books and to integrate even more consumers into its Kindle platform (which is of course Amazon's end-game strategy-the goal is to get people entrenched in the platform so that they will only spend money at Amazon 96 ). So from this perspective, Penguin Random House isn't even a clear winner. 94 Id. at *183. 95 Id. at *183-84. 96 Jeff Bezos has been quoted as saying, We sell the [Kindle] hardware at our cost, so it is break-even on the hardware. We want to make money when people use our devices, not when people buy our devices. . . . What we find is that when people buy a Kindle they read four times as much as they did before they bought the Kindle. But Moreover, as the Apple case has shown, publishers are interested not necessarily in innovating in order to compete with Amazon, but rather in increasing (or at least maintaining) their bottom line; they turned to each other and to Apple out of fear and powerlessness. Rather than innovate in order to incentivize consumers to shop at places other than Amazon and/or to pay more than Amazon's price for the e-books, the publishing companies sought refuge in the less creative alternative: conspire together to withhold e-books from Amazon unless Amazon agreed to allow the companies to switch to a new model in order to jack up the prices. There seems to be no reason to think that Penguin Random House is going to do anything other than force Amazon to agree to an agency pricing model; and though this may increase the publishers' revenue, it is not clear that consumers will benefit in any way, but instead will suffer by being required to pay higher prices for e-books-as the publishers have wanted all along.
The twofold layer of ambiguity here-between (1) whether Amazon or Penguin Random House will benefit from the merger; and (2) whether giving the publishers the ability to increase their bargaining power with Amazon through sheer increased market share, rather than through other clearly beneficial and competitive means, e.g. innovation, is going to benefit consumers (or merely just competition)-suggests that the DOJ erred in not publicizing its competitive assessment. How can we be sure that the DOJ, in anticipating the increased bargaining power Penguin Random House will have with Amazon, missed the forest for the trees by neglecting to consider the short-term benefit to Amazon (which may translate to a long-term benefit for Amazon)? Or, if the conventional wisdom is correct, and Penguin Random House will be better poised to grapple with Amazon-is this necessarily to consumers' benefit? Has the DOJ mistakenly believed that benefitting a certain competitor is the same as benefitting competition?
As these questions illustrate, the DOJ's quiet approval of mergers leaves too much to the imagination; greater transparency in the DOJ's decision-making process would reveal the impacts the DOJ expects mergers to have on the relevant markets-as well as whether these expectations are grounded in the realities of the market. In three years, we may know the answer to these questions: either Amazon will have a more unshakeable hold over the e-book market (which, it is not at all clear is harmful to consumers); or Penguin Random House will exert its muscle against Amazon in order to raise prices (which will likely be detrimental to consumers). It's even possible-albeit somewhat improbable if the prior actions of the publishing industry are any indication-that Penguin Random House will actually use its greater resources to spur innovation to compete honestly with Amazon. Time will tell. However, had the DOJ provided more information to the public concerning their rationale for approving this merger, we would have a lot less uncertainty in, at the very least, what the expected pro-competitive benefits of the merger are.
